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‘Pre-Accession Europeanization’: The Case of Serbia and Kosovo 
Spyros Economides and James Ker-Lindsay 
London School of Economics 
 
 
Abstract 
This article argues that there is much confusion surrounding Serbia’s landmark decision to 
engage in a process of normalization with Kosovo. Rather than undergoing a process of 
Europeanization, whereby a fundamental transformation in the underlying rationale and 
processes of decision-making occurred, as some have argued, the changes in Serbia’s policy 
are in fact based on material concerns. By tracing relations in the EU-Serbia-Kosovo triangle, 
the article shows that change in Serbia’s approach towards Kosovo is based on pragmatism 
and political opportunism, rather than absorption, adaptation, convergence or identity 
formation. What we have witnessed is a more short-term, interest based policy shift serving 
very specific economic purposes. In conceptual terms, this is better understood as a policy of 
rationally instrumental ‘pre-Accession Europeanization’ rather than as a process of adaptive 
normative Europeanization as more conventionally understood in the literature. 
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Introduction 
It has been argued that Serbia has remained one of ‘the most reluctant 
Europeanizers…persistently understudied and undertheorised in the Europeanization 
literature’ (Subotić, 2010). Certainly, the European Union (EU) and Serbia have had a 
difficult relationship. For many years, tensions were focused on Serbia’s lack of co-operation 
with the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). More recently, 
however, the interaction between Europe and Serbia has been predominantly shaped by the 
deep differences that emerged between Serbia and the EU in the aftermath of Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence, in February 2008. This led to a series of confrontations between 
Belgrade and the EU. 
 
However, starting in 2011, the situation began to improve dramatically. Under the auspices of 
the EU’s External Action Service, a process of dialogue started between Belgrade and Pristina 
on 8 March 2011. In the first stage of the talks, the primary focus was on securing agreements 
across three key objectives: ‘improve the life of the people, achieve better cooperation in the 
Balkans and move the region closer to the EU’ (B92, 2011b). This eventually led to 
agreements on the exchange of cadastral records, the mutual recognition of diplomas and a 
mechanism for integrated border/boundary management (IBM), and the participation of 
Kosovo at meetings of regional organisations. Next, the EU turned its attention towards wider 
political issues, including the question of how to integrate the Serbian communities living in 
the north of Kosovo; which had steadfastly rejected any and all attempts by Pristina to assert 
its authority over them. Following a further series of discussions, overseen by Catherine 
Ashton, the two sides initialled a fourteen point ‘First Agreement of Principles Governing the 
Normalization of Relations’, in April 2013. As well as establishing an Association of Serb 
Majority Municipalities, the agreement also stipulated that the Serbian police and courts in 
Kosovo would be integrated into the Kosovo structures of governance. The agreement, which 
was widely praised internationally, was significant inasmuch as it effectively signalled the 
end of Serbia’s attempts to secure the partition of Kosovo. Similarly, the commitment made 
both Serbia and Kosovo not to impede the other’s process of European integration, effectively 
marked Serbia’s acceptance that Kosovo would pursue its own EU accession path. Perhaps 
most importantly, as a result of this steady normalization of relations between Belgrade and 
Pristina, the way was opened for Serbia to formally start accession talks. These formally 
began on 21 January 2014 (Council of the European Union, 2014). 
 
In view of the major transformation that occurred in Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo, there 
has been a growing interest, both in the academic and policy communities, in understanding 
and explaining the factors underpinning this policy change. It would certainly be tempting to 
ascribe Serbia’s change of tack to the ‘pulling power’ of the EU and the associated concept 
(to some, a theory) of Europeanization, whereby ‘recipient states’ adopt the values, standards 
and practices, and procedures of the EU and its member-states and thus, in short, become 
‘European’. The assumption is this: the prospect of opening accession negotiations and 
ultimately joining the EU proved a powerful enough incentive for the Serbian political elite – 
and particularly a government painted as radical nationalists – to soften its stance on 
engagement with Kosovo and begin a process of normalization of relations. In doing so, they 
showed an understanding and appreciation of European values of reconciliation. As the 
Enlargement Strategy Report of the European Commission stated: ‘[T]he historic agreement 
reached by Serbia and Kosovo* [sic] in April [2013] is further proof of the power of the EU 
perspective and its role in healing history’s deep scars’ (European Commission, 2013). 
 
But just how far can standard notions of Europeanization explain the changes that occurred? 
To be sure, the idea that the European Union has ‘transformative power’ is widely accepted. 
The EU, by virtue of its values, its identity, and its material wealth, its ‘power’, can affect 
fundamental changes in the behaviour of states which are eligible for membership. (Börzel 
and Risse, 2003; Grabbe, 2006). However, in the case of Serbia’s change of attitude towards 
its interaction with Kosovo, is it correct to link it directly to the EU’s transformative power 
and a more general process of Europeanization in Serbia (Keil, 2013; Obradovic-Wochnik 
and Wochnik, 2012)? This article argues that rather than the result of embedded changes to 
identity and normative value systems, the transformation of Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo 
is in fact based on material concerns. If this is Europeanization, it is not a process of 
Europeanization as more usually understood. Instead, it appears to be Europeanization as a 
policy. Drawing on Sedelmeier (2006), this is better described as a separate concept of ‘pre-
accession Europeanization’. 
 
Europeanization as Process or Policy?  
The essential question posed in this article is this: is the changing relationship between Serbia 
and Kosovo evidence of the Europeanization of Serbia? This inevitably raises the question: 
what does Europeanization mean in this context? As already noted, it is about adoption of 
values. However, a fundamental premise of the literature on Europeanization is that it is a 
process (Börzel 2002; Featherstone, 2003; Ladrech, 1994). Moreover, it is a process of 
change that transcends the conventional legal and political transformations that occur through 
the technical process of integration centred on the acquis communautaire (Radaelli, 2003). 
 
While most of the literature on Europeanization has focused on changes within member 
states, a body of work has emerged that has dealt with the impact of the EU on states in the 
formal accession process (Grabbe, 2003; Grabbe 2006, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2005; 2011; Sedelmeier 2006). More recently, the literature has expanded to include those 
states at an even earlier stage in the integration process (Börzel, 2011; Börzel and Risse, 
2011; Schimmelfennig, 2009). These are states that have, since 2003, been said to have a 
‘European perspective’ (European Council, 2003), but have yet to start accession 
negotiations. In particular, there has been growing attention on the Western Balkans; a region 
that is usually defined as the states of former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia but including 
Albania. (See Bache et.al., 2011; Börzel, 2011b; Elbasani, 2013; Fakiolas and Tzifakis, 2008; 
Kostovicova and Bojičić-Dželilović, 2006; Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit, 2011; Obradović-
Wochnik and Wochnik, 2012.)  
 
This more recent work on states with a European perspective builds on previous research on 
the effects of enlargement, and the processes of Europeanization and transformation derived 
from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) experience, which argued that Europeanization 
was a more powerful source of change in the European context than other transformation 
trends in the post-Cold War period (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2006), it necessarily 
differs in several key ways. Most significantly, it has had to incorporate the extra demands 
placed in the path of all Western Balkans states, namely the Stabilisation and Association 
process (Phinnemore, 2003; Phinnemore, 2013; Pippan, 2004), and the lack of a hard 
guarantee of eventual membership (for example, Stahl, 2011). Although the states of the 
region are eligible for EU membership, they are not promised early, or easy, access to the 
club. Another factor that bears similarities with CEE experience, but is rather different in the 
case of the Western Balkans, is the use of a strict conditionality. While conditionality was a 
key part of the CEE enlargement, it was confined to the narrower accession negotiation 
process. In the case of the Balkans, it has been applied to the pre-accession period (see, 
Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003; and Bieber, 2011). 
 
This consequently means that the process of Europeanization – or, perhaps more accurately, 
the process of encouraging Europeanization or even ‘Europeanization-like’ behaviour – 
begins at an earlier stage in the Balkans than it did in CEE (see, Pridham, 2007; 
Schimmelfennig, 2008). As the literature has developed, this early stage encouragement of 
Europeanization has given rise to the notion of ‘Europeanization via enlargement’. In the 
Western Balkan context this has been most explicitly noted by Elbasani (2013, p.7). The 
problem is that the two elements – enlargement and Europeanization – can become conflated. 
While the process of Europeanization runs hand-in-hand with enlargement, the danger is that 
there then becomes a tendency to see all forms of modified behaviour as evidence of 
normative adaptation. While enlargement may encourage Europeanization, it does not follow 
that all policy change is necessarily evidence of Europeanization. As noted, Europeanization 
as a process is in fact distinct from that of integration (Radaelli, 2003). 
 
If Europeanization is seen as an intrinsic part of the enlargement process, which is essentially 
centred on adopting the acquis communautaire and the creation of an EU member state (for 
example, Keil, 2013), then equating enlargement with Europeanization means that the latter 
loses its original and distinctive definition as a process centred on the gradual adoption of 
European norms and values and of basing decisions on, and taking decisions in, a ‘European 
way’. It is no longer necessarily about convergence, or adaptation, or socialisation, or 
absorption, or about ‘the adoption of EU norms on a given issue … for the purposes of EU 
integration’ (Obradović-Wochnik, 2012, p. 1159). Nor is it about Europeanization as identity 
(Stahl, 2011), or identity ‘convergence’ or ‘divergence’ (Subotić, 2011). Instead, 
Europeanization is seen to occur through the mere act of fulfilling the conditions for 
membership as laid down by the European Union. 
 
The crucial difference, as noted already is that while, in the case of Central and Eastern 
Europe, conditionality was an intrinsic part of the integration process designed as an 
instrument for cajoling and coercing candidate states into fulfilling legal, economic and 
technical requirements of EU membership, in the Western Balkans the EU has been using 
conditionality at a far earlier stage. A range of demands are made that have to be fulfilled if 
the prospective candidate is to move onto the escalator of the enlargement process. These 
demands may be technical; such as capacity- and institution-building measures or others of 
reform and restructuring. Alternatively, the demands made may have normative roots; such as 
promoting EU values or be driven by moral concerns – areas that are more usually associated 
with traditionally conceptualization of Europeanization as a process of learning. 
 
Europeanization in this form is therefore not so much about adaptation, although this may 
certainly occur. Instead, it is based on ‘instrumental rationality’ ties to conditionality where, 
‘actors are conceived as (mostly self-interested) utility maximisers who select their course of 
action according to cost benefit calculations (Börzel and Risse, 2011, p. 5). In the institutional 
logic approach of appropriateness and consequence, there is an observed tendency with 
respect to pre-accession or candidate Europeanisation to privilege the instrumental approach 
of rational consequentialism. Appropriateness in the form of institutionally driven ‘normative 
pressure’ (Kelley, 2004), the spreading of norms resulting in attitudinal and behavioural 
change, whether described as convergence, adaptation, or social learning/lesson-drawing is a 
secondary phenomenon at this stage. They do not, in essence, require the adoption or 
absorption, over a longer period of time, and as the result of EU membership, of a 
normatively driven change in attitude or of a reshaping of identity. The European Union 
demands of the ‘recipient’ policy changes, which are then likely to be rewarded by a 
furthering of their integration prospects. 
 
The process is, in practice, not driven by a ‘logic of appropriateness’, it is driven by necessity: 
it is the practical ‘preparation of the ground’ for fulfilling the prospect of EU accession. 
Convergence may be occurring but on a very specific issue with a very specific goal in mind 
under the pressure of a strict conditionality. It may be that as a result of the procedures of 
accession, and in the long-term, a reformist political agenda will emerge based on the notion 
of ‘legitimacy of rules and appropriateness of behaviour’ (Schimmmelfennig and 
Sedelemeier, 2011, p. 667). But for the time being that is not in evidence. Europeanization is 
thus a conscious policy, relying on external incentives of the carrot and stick variety 
(conditionality) which are based on a cost-benefit calculation. It is the product of rationalist 
institutionalism based on the, ‘credible external incentives underpinning EU conditionality’ 
(Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 6). This variant of the external incentive model suggests that ‘candidate 
countries have to Europeanise as a condition and not a consequence of membership’ (Börzel 
and Risse, 2011, p. 15). In its extreme form, this can be regarded as Europeanization by 
‘external imposition’ (Juncos, 2011). In this case the external incentive is not merely a short-
term reward but also the ‘golden carrot’ of EU membership (Börzel, 2011b, p.3). 
 
However, and crucially, within this rationalist institutionalist approach there is still an 
acknowledgement that, ultimately, Europeanization is still dependent on the decisions of the 
internal actors (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, 2005, Sedelmeier, 2006). The EU can 
impose a condition that must be met for further integration. However, it is up to decision 
makers within the state in question to decide, on the basis of their own calculations and 
interests, whether they wish to accept the condition laid down. It is about choice. In this 
process, domestic actors – and their interests and/or ideas – play a crucial role in matters of 
causality.  They help to form the ‘missing link’ between EU and domestic levels of policy-
making (Goetz, 2000, p.222); or what Featherstone has called the ‘interactive link between 
the “domestic” and “EU” spheres of activity’ (Featherstone, 2003, p. 13). In this particular 
case, we identify a causality stemming from their rational set of preferences, driven by their 
interest-based calculations, which are primarily self-serving and often short-term.  
Emphatically, they cannot be usefully seen as purveyors of a ‘Europeanness’ or as ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ (as in a constructivist frame). They do not display strong ideological 
affiliations or a distinct set of norms.  Rather, they can be better understood as being driven 
by material calculations of the gains to be had from the EU in a consequentialist frame and 
here we assess the utility of doing so.   
 
In the existing literature, which has been centred on Central and Eastern Europe, this 
phenomenon of rational instrumentalist Europeanization has come to be known as ‘candidate 
Europeanisation’ (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 19). However, in the context of the discussion about 
Serbia and other countries of the Western Balkans, where it covers a whole spectrum of 
integration stages, it is perhaps better termed as ‘pre-accession Europeanization’. 
 
 
Serbia-EU relations and the emergence of the Kosovo issue 
Over the course of the past two decades Serbia has had a difficult relationship with the EU. It 
was a key protagonist of the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, leading to its international 
isolation. In 1999, many EU members played an active role in the NATO military campaign 
against Serbia to end the conflict in Kosovo. The ousting of Slobodan Milosevic, in October 
2000, led to a rapid rapprochement between Serbia and the EU (Subotić, 2010). However, the 
optimism that Serbia would be able to press ahead with EU integration suffered a setback 
with the assassination Zoran Djindić, the modernising prime minister, in April 2003. 
Thereafter, relations between Serbia and the EU failed to make as much progress as had been 
anticipated. Although a European Partnership was adopted by the Council in 2004, a range of 
internal issues, including democratization, judicial reform, criminality and respect for 
minority rights, remained a source of concern. Most importantly, Serbia’s lack of co-
operation with the ICTY, and impasse over the status of Kosovo, became the key obstacles to 
the country’s process of European integration (Subotić, 2010). 
 
In late 2005, the UN announced talks on the future status of Kosovo. Despite Serbia’s strong 
opposition, from the outset it was clear that the talks would lead to some form of statehood 
for Kosovo, with support from the United States (US) as well as a number of leading 
members of the EU. (See, Weller, 2009; Ker-Lindsay, 2009; and Perritt, 2009.) Serbia, in turn 
sought help from Russia, especially in the UN Security Council. While the senior coalition 
partner in the Serbian government, President Boris Tadić’s Democratic Party (DS), vowed to 
continue to defend Serbia’s claim to Kosovo, it nevertheless wished to maintain good 
relations with the EU and strongly favoured the country’s eventual accession to the Union. In 
contrast, the main junior partner in the coalition government, the Democratic Party of Serbia 
(DSS), led by Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, and the main opposition party, the Serbian 
Radical Party (SRS), became increasingly hostile towards the European Union, which they 
saw as being at the forefront of efforts to secure Kosovo’s independence. As a result, by the 
end of 2007, although the question of cooperation with the ICTY remained a key issue, 
relations between Serbia and the European Union were increasingly being shaped by the 
Kosovo issue. 
 
On 17 February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. Many EU states swiftly 
recognised the new state. However, five members of the European Union – Cyprus, Greece, 
Romania, Slovakia and Spain – refused to do so. (Economides and Ker-Lindsay, 2010) This 
split between the members meant that the EU could not ask Serbia to recognise Kosovo as an 
independent state as a condition for membership. Nevertheless, as the large majority of states 
had recognised it, the European Partnership was updated to call on Serbia to, ‘Cooperate 
constructively on matters relating to Kosovo’ (Council of the European Union, 2008). Instead, 
Belgrade chose to wage an active campaign to defend its territorial claim over Kosovo. 
Although the use of military force was categorically rejected, the Serbian government 
established an extensive lobbying effort around the world aimed at preventing recognition by 
other states as well as the entry of Kosovo into various international organisations (see, Ker-
Lindsay, 2012). 
 
Just weeks after the declaration of independence, Serbia held parliamentary elections. This 
was widely perceived to be a referendum on Kosovo versus EU integration. While DS 
adopted a pro-European stance in its campaign, DSS and SRS adopted a strongly nationalist 
line (OSCE, 2008). In an undisguised effort to help secure a DS victory, the EU signed a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia; albeit immediately freezing its 
entry into force until Serbia was deemed to be fully cooperating with the ICTY. As Olli Rehn, 
the then Enlargement Commissioner, explained, ‘We don't want Serbia to give up its 
European integration…The Stabilisation and Association Agreement would be a strong signal 
that the European Union is committed to Serbia's European future.’ (Southeast European 
Times, 2008) 
 
However, the subsequent DS victory did little to change Serbian foreign policy. Rather than 
bring Serbia closer to Europe, as many had expected, Belgrade increasingly balanced its 
stated wish to join the EU by building closer links with Russia and China in order to prevent 
Kosovo from gaining UN membership (B92, 2009). Such efforts, which directly opposed the 
efforts of several EU members to promote Kosovo’s recognition, were regarded as being 
evidence that Serbia was not as engaged with the EU as many believed (FCO interview, May 
2011). (Such a view was rather accurate it turns out. One senior Serbian minister at the time 
noted, in conversation with an author in November 2014, that the pursuit of relations with 
non-Western countries, along the lines of some form of ‘neo-Titoism’, in fact became a 
higher priority for the DS government than EU accession at this point.) The efforts of the 
Serbian foreign minister, Vuk Jeremić, in particular, proved to be a particularly frustrating 
(Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, 2008). Although Kosovo’s prime minister had 
confidently proclaimed that by the end of the year Kosovo would be recognised by 100 states, 
by December 2008, just 52 had done so. 
 
The lowest point in relations between the EU and Serbia occurred when Belgrade’s decided to 
refer Kosovo’s declaration of independence to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This 
went against the expressed wishes of many EU members, including Britain and France (B92, 
2008). Nevertheless, the EU maintained its policy of trying to encourage Serbian integration. 
In September 2008, an attempt to unfreeze the SAA was blocked only by the Netherlands, 
which demanded full cooperation with the ICTY (EU Observer, 2008). Thereafter, in 
December 2009, the EU agreed to lift visa restrictions on Serbian citizens travelling to the EU 
for less than 90 days (BBC News, 2009). However, none of this led to a moderation of 
Serbia’s position on Kosovo. As well as continuing to lobby states not to recognise Kosovo, 
Belgrade blocked Kosovo’s participation in regional gatherings.  
 
On 22 December 2009, and despite the obvious tensions that existed between Serbia and the 
EU over Kosovo, Belgrade submitted an application for membership of the European Union. 
However, no immediate action was taken. In the meantime, on 22 July 2010, the ICJ 
delivered its advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence (International Court 
of Justice, 2010). Rather than decide on whether Kosovo’s statehood was legal, it simply said 
that, except where otherwise stated, for example by a Security Council resolution, there was 
nothing under general international law that said that a declaration of independence was 
illegal. Both sides read this as a victory. Pristina and its supporters believed that this would 
lead to more recognitions (Bosco, 2010). However, Serbia announced that it would not only 
continue to oppose Kosovo’s independence (VOA News, 2010), it would also seek a new 
General Assembly resolution calling for renewed status talks. 
 
The call for new status talks was greeted with considerable anger by Kosovo’s supporters 
within the EU. They wanted Serbia to accept a joint EU position reached after the advisory 
opinion that there should indeed be a new process of dialogue aimed at promoting 
cooperation and improving the lives of people in the region (European Union, 22 July 2010). 
The Serbian government was therefore told in no uncertain terms that efforts to press for new 
status talks would jeopardise Serbia’s future EU (Reuters, 2010). At the last minute, and 
much to the surprise of many Serbian officials who had been lobbying hard for support for the 
Serbian draft resolution, Belgrade relented (Serbian official, comments to authors, August 
2013). Belgrade accepted a proposal from the European Union for a joint resolution that 
‘acknowledged’ the ICJ advisory opinion and welcomed, ‘the readiness of the European 
Union to facilitate a process of dialogue between the parties; the process of dialogue in itself 
would be a factor for peace, security and stability in the region, and that dialogue would be to 
promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to the European Union and improve the 
lives of the people.’ (UN General Assembly, 2010.) The resolution was passed by consensus 
on 8 September 2010. 
 
 
The EU sponsored dialogue process 
The decision to pass a joint resolution appeared to mark a shift in relations between the EU 
and Serbia. Although, Belgrade continued its counter recognition efforts, they were much 
lower key. Moreover, it was now understood that Serbia would start to engage with the 
Kosovo authorities. As a result, in October 2010, the Council agreed to submit Serbia’s 
application for membership to the Commission for an opinion. Following this, and after much 
delay, in part caused by local elections in Kosovo, the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina 
started on 8 March 2011. Over the following months, despite strong domestic opposition in 
Serbia, the process continued with agreements being reached on a number of issues, such as 
freedom of movement across the dividing line, issues relating to documentation held by 
Serbia and the mutual recognition of university diplomas (Al Jazeera, 2011). However, just 
weeks later, violence erupted in Kosovo after Pristina attempted to place its officials at two 
crossing points between Kosovo and Serbia. In retaliation, the Serbs living in the north of 
Kosovo established a number of barricades to block roads into the south, leading to a number 
of clashes between local Serbs and NATO peacekeepers (BBC News, 2011a). After several 
weeks of tension, Angela Merkel travelled to Belgrade and delivered a clear message: ‘If 
Serbia wants to achieve candidate status, it should resume the dialogue and achieve results in 
that dialogue, enable Eulex [the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo] to work in all regions of 
Kosovo, and abolish parallel structures and not create new ones.’ (BBC News, 2011(b); see 
also, Papadimitriou and Petrov, 2012).  
 
The negotiations restarted in September. By now, the Serbian Government accepted that there 
was no realistic alternative to the dialogue process, even though the two sides had reached a 
stalemate (B92, 2011). In the meantime, Serbia’s accession prospects had improved 
dramatically with the arrest of ICTY indictees Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić, the last 
remaining Serbian fugitives, in May and July respectively. In October 2011, the Commission 
recommended that Serbia be awarded candidate status noting that, ‘Serbia is well on its way 
towards sufficiently fulfilling the political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 
1993 and the conditions of the Stabilisation and Association process, provided that progress 
continues and that practical solutions are found to the problems with Kosovo’ (European 
Commission, 2011). In the months that followed, the dialogue continued, resulting in a major 
agreement on integrated border/boundary management (IBM) (BBC News, 2011c). However, 
just days afterwards, and although the members welcomed the fact that a ‘fully satisfactory’ 
level of cooperation had been reached with the ICTY, the EU decided that Serbia could not be 
awarded candidate status until such time as there was evidence that the agreements that had 
been reached were being implemented.  
 
By early 2012, the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo was beginning to change 
dramatically under continuing EU pressure. In March, another breakthrough occurred when 
Belgrade finally agreed to a formula that would allow Kosovo to participate in regional 
organisations as Kosovo*; the asterisk pointing to a footnote stating the following: ‘This 
designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the 
ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.’ As a result, and following a report 
of the Council of the European Union (2012), in February, Serbia was officially awarded 
candidate status (European Council, 2012a), in March 2012.  
 
In May 2012, Serbia went to the polls, first for presidential elections and then parliamentary 
ones. Once again, the contest was seen as a battle between the pro-European DS and the more 
nationalist Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), led by Tomislav Nikolić, which had broken 
away from the nationalist SRS. In reality, the campaign had little to do with Kosovo; the main 
issues of concern were the economy and corruption. Also, unlike the SRS, the Progressives 
had committed themselves to Serbia’s EU integration. (B92, 2012) Nevertheless, many feared 
the worst when Nikolić beat Tadić in the presidential election and, following weeks of 
negotiations, a new coalition government was formed between the Progressives and the 
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). Of even greater concern was the fact that the new prime 
minister was Ivica Dačić, a deputy prime minister under the previous government who was 
better known internationally for having served as the spokesman for Slobodan Milošević. 
 
The new government quickly proved to be more committed to EU accession, both in word 
and deed, than anyone had expected. The President, prime minister and the deputy prime 
minister, Aleksandar Vučić, who was quickly emerging as the strong man in the Progressives 
and in the government, all insisted that Serbia would pursue its EU integration path and 
would remain committed to dialogue with Pristina. More to the point, Dačić proved to be far 
bolder in his approach towards Pristina than the previous pro-EU DS administration. In a 
major break with the previous dialogue, which was overseen by senior officials, it was now 
decided that the talks would take place between the two prime ministers. The first of these 
took place in October 2012 (European Voice, 2012), and was the first time that any serving 
senior official of the Serbian Government had met with Hashim Thaci, Kosovo’s prime 
minister, since the declaration of independence. Moreover, unlike the earlier dialogue process 
that had been overseen by Robert Cooper, Counsellor in the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), the new talks were now chaired by the EU High Representative, Catherine 
Ashton. Against this backdrop, Serbia now pressed the case for being awarded a date for the 
start of actual accession talks. Meeting in December 2012, the Council of the European Union 
decided that it would decide on a date for the start of talks the following spring (Council of 
the European Union, 2012b). 
 
In the months that followed, the two prime minister met on numerous occasions. In Serbia, 
both Dačić and Nikolić increasingly appeared to indicate that Serbia was preparing to 
relinquish Kosovo. As well as hints by Dačić that Kosovo might eventually gain UN 
membership, in April 2013 the government produced a ‘Platform on Kosovo’. Although the 
official Serbian position was it would never recognise Kosovo, the document appeared to be a 
blueprint for Serbia’s acceptance of Kosovo’s sovereignty within its defined boundaries. This 
was seemingly confirmed, later that month, when Belgrade and Pristina signed a fourteen-
point agreement, the ‘First Agreement’, intended to end Serbia’s contestation of the 
boundaries of Kosovo and the extent of Pristina’s authority over the territory. (The text of the 
agreement was never formally published. However, it was leaked and widely republished. 
See, for example, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2013.)   
 
The April 2013 agreement is seen as an important step, despite the fact that there have been 
serious problems in its implementation. Local and national elections have been held, basic 
principles have been maintained and dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina continues. But 
there is still great resistance among the public at large who find that the, ‘the Brussels 
negotiations were “about us, without us”’ (SEESOX, 2014, p. 5). While Serbia stopped short 
of recognising Kosovo, the dialogue and ensuing agreement was an implicit acceptance of the 
existence of an autonomous Kosovo, the legitimisation of its government, and the acceptance 
of its separate EU integration process. (For more on Kosovo’s integration process, see Ker-
Lindsay and Economides, 2012.) This was an enormous sacrifice for any Serbian government, 
especially those of a more nationalist orientation. Nevertheless, by signing this agreement, the 
government made more progress on Kosovo than previous, more ‘pro-European’, 
administrations. The obvious quid pro quo for this change was the start of accession 
negotiations. In a report issued in May 2013, the Commission recommended that membership 
talks be opened with Serbia (European Commission, 2013). On 28 June 2013, the Council 
commended Serbia for its efforts over Kosovo and endorsed the start of membership talks by 
January 2014 (European Council 2013). Accession negotiations eventually began on 21 
January 2014. 
 
Understanding Serbia’s policy change 
What factors can explain the change in Serbia’s behaviour? First and foremost, a policy of 
trying to downplay the differences over Kosovo as far as possible and encourage Serbia to 
adopt a more conciliatory approach through the use of rewards and incentives was generally 
unsuccessful. In the period prior to the ICJ opinion, when Serbia was adopting a policy that 
was seen by many states as being mainly antagonistic, the EU made considerable efforts to try 
to encourage the broadly pro-European elements in the country. It signed the SAA prior to the 
April elections, when tensions in Serbia over Kosovo were at their very highest. In addition, 
in December 2009, it eased the visa regime. However, neither initiative brought about a major 
policy shift in Serbia, either in terms of Belgrade’s attempts to prevent the international 
recognition of Kosovo or in terms of its willingness to meet with Kosovo officials. 
 
In contrast, a more negative form of conditionality appears to have had a profound impact of 
Serbian policy. In the aftermath of the ICJ case, the EU agreed that Serbia and Kosovo would 
have to engage in a process of dialogue and engagement and that success in this field would 
become a condition for further Serbian EU integration. Thereafter, as the number of 
agreements increased, the implementation of the agreements was also incorporated into the 
conditionality process. This initiative was further strengthened by the fact that there was little 
room for doubt that Serbia would have no prospect of EU integration unless it complied fully 
with the demands that had been imposed. At the forefront these efforts was Germany. Berlin 
left little doubt that it would be unwilling to allow Serbia gain candidacy, let alone full 
accession talks, without defined progress. This was seen particularly in the case of Merkel’s 
visit to Serbia in August 2011. Her uncompromising message to Serbian leaders came as a 
surprise to other EU partners. Even Britain, which had been willing to use tough language 
with Belgrade in the past, was surprised at just how direct the threat was. However, it was 
ultimately seen to have had the most profound effect in terms of moderating Serbia’s 
behaviour (FCO interview, May 2013). Even Serbian officials acknowledge that Germany’s 
evident willingness to follow through on its threats to block accession was a crucial 
component in changing Serbian policies. As one official explicitly acknowledged, ‘it worked’ 
(Serbian official, comments, November 2013). 
 
This in turn raises the question of why did Belgrade choose to relent in the face of pressure 
when Kosovo had obviously been such a key national priority? The overwhelming reason 
given by Serbian policy makers is that it was driven by economic concerns. It is important to 
bear in mind that the discussions over Kosovo coincided with a significant economic 
downturn in Serbia. Along with much of South East Europe, Serbia was deeply affected by 
the economic and financial problems within the European Union. As the World Bank (2013) 
noted, Serbia has been, ‘struggling to recover from the impact of the international crisis, 
which led to a 50 percent spike in poverty and a similar jump in unemployment.’ Meanwhile, 
a growing debt and deficit, and the rising risk of another recession (Macdowall, 2014), left the 
government with little choice but to pursue preferential loans from a variety of sources, 
especially the Gulf states, to relieve the debt burden and plug the growing gap in public 
finances that left the country teetering on the risk of bankruptcy (Bloomberg, 2013; Financial 
Times, 2013).  
 
Both publicly and privately, the EU has come to be seen by officials as the key to national 
economic growth. As far back as 2012, shortly after he was elected, the most nationalist of the 
current political elite in Serbia, President Tomislav Nikolić, told a Serb audience that, [W]e 
want to get into the EU, because it has projects, jobs and investments for us’. (Tanjug, 2012). 
As Prime Minister, Ivica Dačić also emphasised this point: ‘our aim is to get into the EU and 
consolidate the economic system as soon as possible’ (Tanjug, 2013). Most recently, Prime 
Minister Vučić made this clear in a recent public lecture in London (Vučić, 2014). This point 
has also been repeatedly reinforced in discussions with senior Serb officials, including 
someone very closely involved in the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue (November, 2013), as well 
as a senior Serbian diplomat (November, 2014).  
 
This has also been mirrored amongst wider public opinion. As the standard of living in Serbia 
decreased and unemployment rose, people not only began to rank Kosovo as a lower order 
issue in the lists of concerns (as evidenced by the low level of support given to the most hard-
line parties on the issue), they also realised that the perpetuation of a strong campaign to 
maintain Kosovo, and the attendant delay in EU integration, could not only delay economic 
recovery but would also delay the speed with which Serbia could gain access to the funds 
made available to countries engaged in the accession process. Neighbouring Croatia, for 
example, received over €1 billion from the EU through the Instrument for Pre-Accession in 
the six years preceding its accession (European Commission, 2012). Opinion polls carried out 
in Serbia both by the Serbian European Integration Office on the ‘European Orientation of the 
Citizens of Serbia’ (2014), and the EU Delegation to Serbia (2014) now show that economic 
factors now feature as the primary reasons why people favour EU membership. The latter 
‘showed that 57 percent of Serbian citizens support Serbia's membership in the EU. The main 
reasons are of economic nature: better future, prosperity (42 percent), improved living 
standard (41 percent) and employability (32 percent). 
 
Throughout the interviews carried out with policy makers, it became clear that, given the 
choice between defending its claim on Kosovo and losing EU accession prospects and EU 
funding, or moderating its stance on Kosovo and furthering EU accession, officials felt that 
Serbia had absolutely no choice but to pick the latter option, as painful as this may be to 
national pride.   
 
What does this tell us about Europeanization? In reality, Europeanization, as traditionally 
understood, appears to have played very little role in moderating the substance of Serbian 
policy. In discussions with Serbian officials it becomes very clear that there was very little by 
way of traditional Europeanization in any of the choices they made. Their decisions were not 
by and large a reflection of core European values, nor of processes of adaptation or 
socialisation. Nor did they suggest that Serbian identity was being transformed. At the 
theoretical margins, change in Serbia and Serbian policies, which have facilitated the pro-
European agenda, have resulted from a EU assisted ‘democratizing effect’, which may have 
made Serbian politics more ‘EU-compatible’ and resulted in a process of ‘adapting’ under EU 
pressure (Vachudova, 2014). There was certainly no evidence to suggest that Serbian decision 
makers had simply accepted the loss of Kosovo for the sake of being more European. Quite 
the contrary, even now most appear to believe that ‘Kosovo is Serbia’. However, when faced 
with a stark choice between the EU and Kosovo, they chose to pursue membership of the 
former rather than pursue the claim to the latter (Pond, 2013). Of course, it could be suggested 
that there was some degree of Europeanization present in aspects of the Serbian government’s 
handling of the issue. But even here, caution must be applied. For example, while the Serbian 
government’s decision to disavow the use of force when Kosovo declared independence was 
in part driven by an understanding that this was an un-European way of managing 
neighbourly differences, it must also be recognised that the decision was shaped by the 
understanding that the use military means to retake Kosovo would have inevitably brought it 
into conflict with NATO, which maintains a peacekeeping force in Kosovo.  
 
Indeed, another example from the sphere of foreign policy provides another indication that 
while Serbia may have made concessions of Kosovo they have been made for very specific 
reasons and that general convergence is yet to occur. Serbia’s recent policy towards Russia in 
the context of the Ukraine crisis diverges quite dramatically from the EU mainstream. While 
the crisis in Ukraine rages, Serbia refuses to condemn Russian actions, participate in EU/US-
led sanctions, and generally deviate from its pro-Russian position (Balkan Insight, 2014). 
Prime Minister Vučić has been on an official visit to Moscow and President Nikolić persists 
in praising the close ties between Belgrade and Moscow in the economic and political arena. 
This is not the sign of a country in the process of adapting or adopting EU to EU policy or 
converging with the mainstream. The difference is that, as yet, EU officials have not sought to 
condition Serbian integration with convergence with EU policy, such as it is, on Russia. If 
this does happen, one suspects that Serbia would change its position. 
 
To this extent, the change of Serbian policy towards Kosovo should not be viewed in the 
context of a logic of appropriateness with its normative and behavioural connotations. The 
emphasis lies primarily in explaining the rational and essentially materialist motivations of 
Serbian policy change. The case of Serbia is a case of rational, cost-benefit analysis: 
instrumental calculations based on a consequentialist logic leading to a specific and 
significant change in a highly important and visible policy area. There is an instrumentalism 
at play. The EU has set conditions and employs the ultimate incentive of membership as a 
tool. It is, in the long-term a very attractive determinant of relations between Serbia and the 
EU, which can, in Serbia’ eyes only be improved through beginning a dialogue with Kosovo. 
But whether the change of tack in Serbia’s Kosovo policy can be characterised as 
Europeanization, even in the instrumental sense is debatable. What is argued here is that 
through a determined effort by specific governments, against the broad tide of public opinion, 
an explosive issue of national interest was addressed in a very unexpected way for the 
purpose of managing it and achieving material gain. The governments which negotiated the 
Brussels Agreement, and are leading Serbia into accession negotiations, are neither norm 
entrepreneurs nor are they using accession conditionality as an externally imposed legitimiser 
of an unpopular liberal reform agenda (Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit, 2011). They are 
certainly not behaving according to a logic of appropriateness, ‘motivated by internalized 
identities, values and norms’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelemeier, 2004, p. 667).  
 
What Belgrade is attempting to do is to benefit materially from entering the process of 
accession talks, and the long-term prospect of EU accession, at a time of an acute and steadily 
deepening economic crisis. Some reforms have taken place, an anti-corruption drive is 
seemingly being pursued, but these are minimal steps. A more accommodating attitude 
towards Kosovo has begun, a continuing and difficult dialogue is in place, but there is no 
prospect of an immediate and total agreement which could only come through recognition. As 
such, what is occurring is certainly not Europeanization as transformation, nor is normatively 
driven. The external incentive model is at play but the sequence of actions-reactions suggests 
that the consequentialist logic is out of kilter. There is an underlying acceptance of rational 
instrumentalism but it is driven primarily internally and by necessity. 
 
 
Conclusion 
What we have argued here is that a profound change has indeed taken place in Serbian 
attitudes towards Kosovo since it unilaterally declared independence, in 2008, and that this 
transformation has come about as a direct result of the influence of the EU. However, it is 
highly questionable whether this change amounts to a transformation that can be attributed to 
a process of Europeanization, as traditionally understood in the literature. The shift in Serbian 
policies does not appear to be shaped on normative, value-based considerations, amounting to 
some sense of Europeaness which would be a necessary variable in identifying the process of 
Europeanization. Rather, change has taken place in Serbian policy on Kosovo as a result of 
the type, level and duration of EU conditionality imposed on Serbia. The decision taken by 
Belgrade to engage with Pristina, which eventually led to the groundbreaking April 2013 
Agreement, is a direct result of the consequentialist logic of a rational pursuit of EU accession 
rather than a logic of appropriateness linked to socialisation, adaptation or identity formation. 
The transformation of Serbia’s policy is not because of a desire to become European in an 
idealised fashion, but because of the need for EU membership for realistic, practical reasons. 
If convergence has taken place it has pragmatic or utilitarian functions. 
 
The fact that enlargement and Europeanization are often conflated in the literature means that 
steps taken in the name of integration are seen by observers as evidence of an underlying 
process of Europeanization in a normative adaptive sense. Rather, it should be seen as the 
result of a separate and rather different policy of rationally instrumentalist pre-accession 
Europeanization. Of course, this integration process may result in a normative 
Europeanization further on down the line, in the sense that the need to comply with the acquis 
and greater contact with the policies and policy-making systems of the EU could engender 
European ways of thinking, behaving, deciding and acting. However, in the context of the 
Serbian–Kosovo relationship, and the EU’s role in this to date, this is not yet evident. 
 
What we have seen in the case of Serbia in fact points to far wider question about the role of 
Europeanization and the foreign policy of states, particularly on matters of conflict or key 
aspects of national interest, regardless of whether they are potential candidates, candidates, 
accession states, or even full members. In reality, as the literature suggests, it would appear 
that Europeanization, as traditionally conceived as a normative phenomenon, tends to be a 
very slow process. What we see here is a rather different phenomenon of ‘pre-accession 
Europeanization’; a simulacrum of Europeanization that is based on a policy of rationally 
instrumentalizing EU integration. As the case of Serbia has graphically highlighted, acts that 
can be read as instances of Europeanization are perhaps be better understood as calculated 
steps designed to meet stringent conditions laid down by the EU in order to meet specific 
interests or goals of national decision makers, without any normative or values-based 
transformation having taken place. 
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